Opinion & Thought Leadership · Central Africa

Diplomacy Without Teeth: Why Eastern Congo's Peace Tracks Keep Failing Its People

By: Nia Mbala

As fighting rages in North and South Kivu despite the Washington and Doha tracks, this column argues that parallel diplomacy without enforcement or Congolese ownership cannot protect civilians. It calls for coordinated accountability, protected health access, and genuine Congolese-led dialogue over donor-driven frameworks.

The facts, as reported, are stark enough to need no embellishment. The Washington accords of December 2025 addressed Congo-Rwanda tensions; the Doha track, with its 15 November framework, sought to end fighting between Kinshasa and the Congo River Alliance, which includes the Rwanda-backed M23. Yet in early November, fighters advanced through the Kahuzi-Biega reserve and captured towns including Bitale and Bulambika. More than 160,000 people were displaced by one official's count. Médecins Sans Frontières has had to move hospital operations out of Bunyakiri after drone strikes near the facility, into a health centre in Maibano that lacks the oxygen concentrators, generators and supplies the hospital had. In Ituri's Mambasa territory, civil society reports at least 75 civilians killed in a single week by suspected ADF fighters, with no military intervention despite repeated alerts. The UN's human rights office recorded nearly 40 percent increases in both violations and victims between August and September. These are not isolated data points; they are a single pattern, reported independently across different provinces and different armed actors, of civilian suffering accelerating precisely as diplomatic machinery grinds forward.

This is the paradox that deserves more scrutiny than it has received: parallel peace tracks are multiplying faster than their results. The African Union's Peace and Security Council said as much on 26 October, noting that implementation under both tracks remained limited and calling for better coordination and an inclusive, Congolese-led dialogue. A civil society coordinator in North Kivu went further, saying the talks had produced no tangible progress at all and urging a national dialogue instead. These are not fringe complaints. They point to a structural weakness in the current architecture: negotiations conducted in Washington, Doha and reportedly Geneva are, by design, state-to-state or state-to-rebel-faction exercises, while the violence on the ground is increasingly fragmented, episodic and resistant to any single signatory's control.

Consider the question of representation, which the reporting leaves genuinely unresolved. Joseph Kabila's Front for the Refoundation of the Nation, announced on 12 October from M23-controlled Goma, claims to have succeeded the Congo River Alliance and inherited its commitments. If that claim is accepted uncritically, Doha's framework rests on a signatory whose authority over fighters on the ground is, at best, unverified. If it is rejected, the framework may have no credible rebel counterpart at all. Either way, the ambiguity is not a technicality; it helps explain why towns keep falling even as papers get signed. Diplomacy that cannot identify who controls the guns cannot realistically disarm them.

A fair-minded reader should also weigh the counterargument that these tracks, however imperfect, remain the only sustained international engagement on offer, and that abandoning them risks worse. The Washington-brokered mechanism, which includes the United States, Qatar, the African Union and Togo as mediator, has at least produced monitoring structures and sanctions leverage, including the 28 October US sanctions on Rwanda's defence ministry over alleged M23 support. Proponents can reasonably argue that institutional patience, not abandonment, is what complex conflicts require, and that premature declarations of failure could hand propaganda victories to armed actors. This is a legitimate caution. But it does not answer the civil society coordinator's point: coordination between tracks is not the same as results for people in Bunyakiri or Mambasa, and patience without protection is cold comfort to a family fleeing drone strikes.

What follows from this is not a rejection of negotiation but an insistence on sequencing it differently. First, protection of civilian infrastructure, especially hospitals, cannot be treated as a byproduct of eventual political settlement; MSF's call for all parties to safeguard health facilities should be treated by mediators as a minimum, verifiable, immediately enforceable condition, separate from the larger political bargain. Second, the question of who legitimately represents armed factions at the table must be resolved before further agreements are signed, not after, given how directly it undermines accountability. Third, the African Union's call for an inclusive, Congolese-led process deserves more weight than it has been given by tracks designed largely around external capitals; local legitimacy, however slower to build, may prove more durable than externally brokered frameworks that Congolese civil society itself describes as hollow.

For African readers watching from Yaoundé, Bangui or Brazzaville, the lesson extends beyond Congo's borders. Diplomacy that produces frameworks without enforcement, and tracks without clarity on who is bound by them, risks becoming theatre that distracts international attention while conflict economies and civilian suffering continue unabated. The test of any peace process should not be the number of signatures it collects, but the number of hospitals that remain open, the number of families that do not have to flee, and the number of children who do not become, as civil society in Mambasa fears, tomorrow's recruits. On that test, the current architecture in eastern Congo is, by its own participants' admission, still failing.

Reporting context: - Fighting Continues in Eastern DR Congo as Peace Tracks Yield Little Change on the Ground: /article/fighting-continues-in-eastern-dr-congo-as-peace-tracks-yield-little--a6f2f24152 - MSF Moves Bunyakiri Hospital Activities After Fighting in DR Congo's South Kivu: /article/msf-moves-bunyakiri-hospital-activities-after-fighting-in-dr-congo-s-de58246a15 - UN Reports Sharp Rise in Human Rights Violations in DR Congo in September: /article/un-reports-sharp-rise-in-human-rights-violations-in-dr-congo-in-sept-599b7d309c - DRC and Rwanda Remain Divided on Washington Accords Ahead of Reported Geneva Talks: /article/drc-and-rwanda-remain-divided-on-washington-accords-ahead-of-reporte-927fdbe4de - Civil Society Says ADF Attacks Have Killed at Least 75 Civilians in a Week in Ituri's Mambasa Territory: /article/civil-society-says-adf-attacks-have-killed-at-least-75-civilians-in--e524a5fbc8 - DR Congo Army Denies Shelling Joseph Kabila's Farm Near Lubumbashi: /article/dr-congo-army-denies-shelling-joseph-kabila-s-farm-near-lubumbashi-bdc532bac6

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