Opinion & Thought Leadership · Central Africa
DR Congo's Referendum Gambit: A Constitution Rewritten While a War Is Lit
By: Nia Mbala
As the Democratic Republic of Congo's National Assembly pushes through a referendum law that could unlock Article 220, and Joseph Kabila declares himself leader of an armed rebellion, Central Africa faces a dangerous convergence of constitutional engineering and renewed conflict that demands sober, principled scrutiny.
Of the many threads running through this week's reporting from Central Africa, one stands above the rest in weight and consequence: the passage, by the Democratic Republic of Congo's National Assembly, of a law establishing the conditions under which a referendum may be held. The vote, taken on Friday 23 October with part of the opposition absent from the chamber, is not merely a technical legislative act. It arrives entangled with the most combustible question in Congolese politics — whether President Félix Tshisekedi intends, eventually, to open the door to amending or replacing the 2006 Constitution, including the provisions in Article 220 that have long been considered untouchable. That this unfolds in the same week that former president Joseph Kabila's declared leadership of an armed rebellion in the east continues to reverberate, and as the opposition's C64 coalition convenes in Rome precisely to decide how to respond to both developments, only sharpens the stakes.
The facts, as reported, are narrower than the anxieties they have provoked. The law incorporates reservations issued earlier by the Constitutional Court and restricts referenda to specific constitutional scenarios: the cession of territory or sovereignty, a change of capital, or a constitutional amendment or wholesale replacement. Government-aligned lawmakers have insisted there is little new in the text. Yet the opposition's reaction — a walkout by the Ensemble group, condemnation from the rights organisation ASADHO, and a lawmaker's warning of "limitless" constitutional change — reflects something reporting alone cannot settle: a deep and, on the available evidence, not unreasonable distrust of the government's intentions. Trust, once eroded by years of disputed elections and unmet promises of dialogue, is not restored by technical reassurances that "little is at stake." The bill still awaits Senate approval, a fact worth underlining, since it leaves open a window, however narrow, for the process to be tested rather than simply ratified.
It is here that this columnist's thesis rests: procedural correctness is not the same as political legitimacy, and a government that seeks to alter the architecture of its own power during a period of active armed conflict bears a heavier, not lighter, burden of justification. The timing is not incidental. Kabila's declaration that he now leads an armed rebellion in the east, combined with a state of siege already in force in parts of the country, means that any move toward constitutional revision is unfolding against a backdrop in which normal political contestation — debate, opposition, electoral accountability — is itself constrained by war. Opposition lawmaker Nicolas Iracan's abstention and his stated fear of unbounded change "while the country faces war" captures a legitimate concern: constitutional moments demand broad national consent precisely when that consent is hardest to secure.
A fair accounting must also register the government's position, however. Reservations from the Constitutional Court were incorporated, suggesting at least a formal check operated as intended. The referendum's scope, as described, remains tethered to specific, enumerated circumstances rather than open-ended empowerment. And Congo's constitutional order has, in fact, changed before through legitimate processes; the mere fact of a referendum law does not predetermine its use for self-serving ends. It would be its own form of overreach to presume bad faith before the Senate has acted, or before any actual referendum question has been proposed. The opposition's suspicion is a reasonable hypothesis grounded in pattern recognition, not yet a demonstrated fact.
What should concern observers across Central Africa, and not only in Kinshasa, is the broader pattern this episode exemplifies: the use of legal and procedural instruments to manage questions that are, at root, about the durability of political power. The region's recent reporting offers parallel cautionary notes — Cameroon's unresolved succession question, its unfilled vice-presidency, and an ailing 93-year-old president whose prolonged absences have left citizens guessing who truly governs, illustrate how institutional ambiguity, whether by design or neglect, can hollow out accountability just as effectively as an overt power grab. Congo's referendum law and Cameroon's succession drift are different in form but share a common structural risk: constitutional and institutional arrangements being shaped, or left deliberately vague, in ways that serve incumbents rather than publics.
For African readers, and Congolese citizens in particular, the practical implications are immediate. A referendum capable of touching Article 220 — provisions historically understood as foundational and not subject to casual revision — would represent a genuine inflection point in the country's post-conflict constitutional settlement. Civil society organisations, the C64 coalition's forthcoming Rome meeting, and the Senate itself now bear real responsibility to ensure that whatever emerges is tested through transparent debate rather than accelerated passage. The government, for its part, would strengthen its own credibility by clarifying precisely what it intends to put before voters, and why now, rather than allowing ambiguity to feed the very suspicions it claims are unfounded.
This is not a counsel of alarmism. It is a call for proportionate vigilance. Legal processes that touch the foundations of a republic deserve neither reflexive condemnation nor uncritical acceptance; they deserve scrutiny proportional to their consequences. Given the coincidence of war in the east, a fractured opposition still finding its voice, and a constitutional process moving faster than public trust can follow, that scrutiny is, for now, well warranted.
Reporting context: - DR Congo's C64 Gathers in Rome in Bid to End Its Public Silence: /article/dr-congo-s-c64-gathers-in-rome-in-bid-to-end-its-public-silence-34e234d030 - DR Congo's National Assembly Passes Referendum Law as Part of Opposition Leaves Chamber: /article/dr-congo-s-national-assembly-passes-referendum-law-as-part-of-opposi-7cc9af3f92 - DR Congo's National Assembly Adopts Referendum Law Once Again: /article/dr-congo-s-national-assembly-adopts-referendum-law-once-again-6755a8afff - Biya's Return to Cameroon Leaves Questions Over Health, Cabinet and Succession: /article/biya-s-return-to-cameroon-leaves-questions-over-health-cabinet-and-s-097cda6855 - DR Congo's C64 Opposition Coalition Says It Defends Respect for the Constitution, Matata Ponyo Says: /article/dr-congo-s-c64-opposition-coalition-says-it-defends-respect-for-the--1f89b47852