Opinion & Thought Leadership · East Africa

Ethiopia's Russian Rearmament and the Illusion of Deterrence in the Horn

By: Amara Tesfaye

Ethiopia's acquisition of Russian Su-35 jets and S-400 systems, amid unravelling peace in Tigray and tension with Eritrea, signals a troubling regional pattern: militarisation as a substitute for political settlement. This column argues East African states must resist externally supplied hardware fixes and invest instead in durable internal reconciliation.

Ethiopia's announcement that it has received twelve Russian Su-35 fighter jets, with four S-400 air defence batteries still to come, deserves to be read as more than a bilateral defence transaction. It is, by the reported account, a signal of how a region under strain is choosing to answer its insecurities: not primarily through negotiated settlement, but through accumulation of hardware. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed's framing of the deal as enabling Ethiopia to "preemptively deter aggression" sits uneasily beside the reported unravelling of the 2022 Pretoria peace agreement, renewed fighting in Tigray, a separate rebellion in Amhara, and unresolved tension with Eritrea. A government reaching for sophisticated weaponry while its internal peace architecture is failing is not obviously pursuing deterrence; it may equally be preparing for the next round of conflict it already expects.

The analysts cited in the reporting are careful to qualify the deal's military value. Benedict Manzin of Sibylline observes that the S-400 systems would be most effective against conventional threats such as Eritrea's limited air force and drones, but he also notes, drawing on the Ukraine experience, that such systems can be overwhelmed by inexpensive drone swarms. This caveat matters. It suggests that the deal's significance may lie less in the battlefield edge it confers than in the political signalling it achieves: Ethiopia demonstrating resolve to domestic audiences and to Eritrea, while Russia demonstrates that its arms diplomacy in Africa, interrupted by no shortage of competing offers from Washington and Beijing, remains commercially and strategically viable. The data point that Russia supplied fifteen percent of Africa's major weapons imports between 2021 and 2025, trailing the United States and China only narrowly, confirms that Addis Ababa's purchase fits a continental pattern rather than representing an isolated choice.

There is a legitimate counterargument that deserves airing. Ethiopia is a sovereign state entitled to arm itself against genuine external threats, and the reported trade figures, bilateral talks on nuclear energy, health and trade, and Abiy's own acknowledgment of continuing Chinese presence and Western investment indicate a government hedging across multiple partners rather than binding itself exclusively to Moscow. Manzin's observation that Ethiopia is "widening its options" is a fair reading of a state managing great-power competition pragmatically, extracting military and economic benefit from several directions at once. African governments have long argued, with justification, that external powers should not dictate their security partnerships, and there is nothing inherently improper in Addis Ababa accepting advanced systems delivered, as Abiy noted, a year ahead of schedule.

Yet the deeper concern is one of sequencing and emphasis. When a state's internal conflicts remain unresolved, as Tigray's reported collapse of the Pretoria framework and the Amhara rebellion suggest, the acquisition of advanced air defence systems and fighter jets does not address the sources of that instability. It may, in fact, entrench the political calculation that military strength is a more reliable instrument than negotiated accommodation. For a region whose recent history includes the human cost of the Tigray war, this is not an abstract worry. The jets and batteries flowing into Ethiopia do not, on the evidence supplied, come paired with any reported diplomatic initiative to restore the Pretoria agreement's credibility or to de-escalate tension with Eritrea through dialogue. The reporting is silent on any parallel peace effort, and that silence is itself instructive.

For African readers beyond Ethiopia's borders, the implications are strategic rather than merely observational. First, the normalisation of great-power arms competition on the continent, with Russia, the United States and China each supplying meaningful shares of major weapons imports, means regional governments will face growing pressure and opportunity to rearm, often justified by genuinely real threats but just as often serving as a substitute for the harder work of internal political settlement. Second, regional bodies such as the African Union and IGAD have a sharpened incentive to insist that military build-ups be accompanied by verifiable commitments to existing peace frameworks, lest arms accumulation become the default response to governance failure across the Horn. Third, ordinary citizens in Tigray, Amhara and across the border in Eritrea bear the practical risk: hardware procured in the name of deterrence can just as easily lower the threshold for renewed confrontation if political trust remains absent.

This column's thesis is therefore a cautious but firm one. The Ethiopia-Russia arms deal, as reported, is a legitimate exercise of sovereign defence policy, but it is being pursued in a vacuum of credible internal reconciliation, and that imbalance should concern anyone invested in the Horn's stability. The region's long-term security will not be purchased through S-400 batteries or Su-35 jets; it will depend on whether Ethiopia's government matches its military modernisation with a renewed, verifiable commitment to the Pretoria process and to dialogue with Eritrea. Absent that, the deterrence Abiy invokes risks becoming, instead, a prelude.

Reporting context: - Analysts Say Russian Jets and Air Defences Deepen Moscow's Foothold in Ethiopia Amid Conflict at Home: /article/analysts-say-russian-jets-and-air-defences-deepen-moscow-s-foothold--f014042850

More reporting from Voice of Africans