Opinion & Thought Leadership · Central Africa
Kinshasa's Referendum Gambit: A Dialogue Built on Exclusion Cannot Heal a Fractured Congo
By: Nia Mbala
DR Congo's Senate has unanimously cleared a referendum law widely seen as paving the way for a Tshisekedi third term, even as he sets conditions for a "national dialogue" the opposition says excludes them. Against a backdrop of war, an Ebola catastrophe and a jailed opposition figure, this concentration of power deserves scrutiny, not applause.
Of all the developments reported across Central Africa this week, none carries graver long-term consequence than the quiet, unanimous vote by which the Democratic Republic of Congo's Senate approved a referendum law that could open the door to a third term for President Félix Tshisekedi. Seventy-eight senators voted; seventy-eight voted yes. No abstentions, no dissent. The bill now awaits the president's signature, having already cleared the National Assembly. It arrives at the same moment Tshisekedi is reported to be setting his own conditions for a "national dialogue," a process the opposition says is designed to exclude them from the outset. Taken together, these two threads describe not a single news event but a pattern, and it is the pattern, more than any one vote, that should concern readers across the region.
The facts as reported are narrow but telling. The law would permit the president to amend the constitution through a constituent assembly followed by a referendum whenever there is a "major dysfunction" of state institutions, a phrase vague enough to accommodate almost any political circumstance a sitting government might wish to invoke. Parliament first passed a broader version in June, only for the Constitutional Court to intervene, objecting to provisions that would have let the president call a referendum on any matter he judged of fundamental importance. Lawmakers were sent back to define the triggering conditions more precisely. That the revised bill nonetheless sailed through both chambers without a single negative vote suggests either genuine consensus or an opposition too marginalised, too intimidated, or too absent from the chamber to register dissent. The reporting does not tell us which, and a fair-minded observer must hold that uncertainty rather than resolve it by assumption.
What can be said with more confidence is that this institutional manoeuvre does not arrive in a vacuum. The same week brought word that opposition figure Prince Epenge, chair of the ADDCongo party and a spokesperson for the Lamuka coalition, was transferred to Kinshasa's overcrowded Makala prison after a court refused his bail, despite his arrest stemming from his public denunciation of a fatal crackdown on a protest march. His lawyer's contention that a man who lodged a complaint about state violence ended up behind bars himself, while the facility is otherwise closed to new admissions, is an allegation rather than an established fact, but it is precisely the kind of detail that colours how a "national dialogue" conducted on the government's terms will be read by Congolese citizens and by the region. Opposition leader Martin Fayulu's description of the transfer as a "death trap" is his characterisation, not a verified condition of the prison, yet it underscores how little trust currently exists between the presidency and its critics.
There is a reasonable counterargument, and it deserves airing. Tshisekedi's government can point to a genuine record of institutional engagement abroad: the World Trade Organization's validation of DR Congo's trade reforms in Geneva, the courting of Russian mediation over the Rwanda-backed M23 insurgency, the push for a renewed MONUSCO mandate. A government managing a war in the east, a humanitarian emergency in Ebola-stricken provinces, and seeking international legitimacy might argue that constitutional flexibility is simply prudent statecraft in extraordinary times, and that the Constitutional Court's earlier intervention proves institutions are still functioning as a check, not as rubber stamps. This is a defensible position, and it would be intellectually dishonest to dismiss it outright on the available reporting.
Yet the thesis this column defends is that the sequencing and manner of these moves matter as much as their legal technicalities. A referendum mechanism engineered to be triggered by executive discretion, paired with a dialogue whose terms the president alone sets, paired further with the jailing of a man who criticised a lethal crackdown, together sketch the architecture of managed consent rather than negotiated legitimacy. The opposition's objection to "exclusions" from the dialogue may or may not be fully substantiated by details we do not have, but the pattern of unanimous legislative votes and contested detentions gives that objection real weight.
For readers across Central Africa, the practical implications extend well beyond Kinshasa. Regional bodies, international partners extending trade goodwill and health cooperation, and ordinary citizens watching a government simultaneously battle an Ebola outbreak that has now claimed more than five thousand lives and confront an insurgency in the east have a stake in whether DR Congo's constitutional order is seen as legitimate or merely convenient. A dialogue that is not genuinely inclusive risks deepening the very "dysfunction" it claims to resolve, inviting the kind of popular disillusionment that, as one opposition figure warned, could feed the perception that armed confrontation succeeds where ballots and courts do not. The Congolese state would serve its own stability, and the region's, far better by opening the referendum process and any national dialogue to visible, verifiable participation from its critics, rather than asking citizens and neighbours to simply trust that executive discretion will be exercised wisely.
Reporting context: - DR Congo's Tshisekedi Sets Conditions for National Dialogue as Opposition Denounces Exclusions: /article/dr-congo-s-tshisekedi-sets-conditions-for-national-dialogue-as-oppos-bc90e6e1c7 - WTO Validates DR Congo's Trade Policy in Geneva Review, a Decade After Its Last: /article/wto-validates-dr-congo-s-trade-policy-in-geneva-review-a-decade-afte-7772ca7c66 - DR Congo Senate Unanimously Passes Referendum Law Seen as Opening Path to Tshisekedi Third Term: /article/dr-congo-senate-unanimously-passes-referendum-law-seen-as-opening-pa-fbc4b24b00 - DR Congo Opposition Figure Prince Epenge Moved to Makala Prison After Bail Refused: /article/dr-congo-opposition-figure-prince-epenge-moved-to-makala-prison-afte-149bb4c93f - DR Congo Ebola Deaths Pass 5,000 as Outbreak Becomes Second Deadliest on Record: /article/dr-congo-ebola-deaths-pass-5-000-as-outbreak-becomes-second-deadlies-6e91da3232 - Tshisekedi Asks Putin to Help Resolve Standoff With Rwanda Over M23 Rebels: /article/tshisekedi-asks-putin-to-help-resolve-standoff-with-rwanda-over-m23--fa3379125a