Opinion & Thought Leadership · Central Africa

Kinshasa's Widening Crisis: When a Constitution Becomes a Battlefield

By: Nia Mbala

Joseph Kabila's turn to armed rebellion, President Tshisekedi's constitutional manoeuvres, and a fractured opposition reveal a Congo where law, legitimacy and force have become dangerously entangled. This column argues that only an independently mediated dialogue, not parallel monologues, can prevent further unravelling.

The Democratic Republic of Congo is approaching a constitutional and military crossroads at the same moment, and the coincidence is not accidental. Within the span of a single week, former president Joseph Kabila declared that he does not renounce armed struggle even as he nominally backs talks in Doha; President Félix Tshisekedi told his parliamentary majority he will accept a further term only "if the people want it," while denying any plan to entrench himself; the National Assembly passed a referendum law that opposition lawmakers say strips away the supposedly untouchable protections of Article 220; and the five-member C64 coalition, meeting in Rome, condemned both a "constitutional coup" and any seizure of power by arms. These developments do not merely compete for headlines. Taken together, they describe a state in which the ordinary mechanisms of political contestation, elections, courts, parliamentary debate, are being hollowed out from two directions at once: by a government accused of rewriting the rules that limit its own tenure, and by an armed movement now fronted by a former head of state who openly questions whether the 2028 election will happen at all.

The gravity of this moment lies in what each side's own words concede. Kabila, interviewed shortly after folding his political network into the Rwandan-backed M23's new Front for the Refoundation of the Nation, told a friendly platform that Doha is merely "one option among others" and that a national dialogue must be built on an independent framework with real guarantors, conditions he insists are absent from Tshisekedi's planned process, which he labels a "monologue." Tshisekedi, in turn, has called Kabila a Rwandan "proxy" brought out of the shadows because the rebel side is "on the ropes," while defending his own constitutional revision and insisting dialogue "will not end the war" but should instead build cohesion through popular consultations. Both men, in other words, are proposing dialogue while simultaneously delegitimising the other's version of it. That is not dialogue; it is the rhetoric of dialogue deployed in service of a contest that each side still expects to settle by other means, Kabila through the leverage of an active insurgency, Tshisekedi through a parliamentary and referendum process he controls.

It is important to distinguish fact from the parties' own framing. That Kabila has joined forces with M23 under a new political-military banner, that he was sentenced to death in absentia for complicity with the rebellion, and that the National Assembly passed the referendum law on 23 October are reported facts. His accusations about drone attacks against him in Goma, and Tshisekedi's characterisation of the FRN as merely giving "a Congolese face" to foreign aggression, are each the assertions of an interested party and should be read as such. The same caution applies to the opposition's claim, voiced by lawmaker Gracien Iracan de Saint-Nicolas, that the referendum law leaves no constitutional provision truly locked; this is a legal interpretation, a serious and plausible one given the law's incorporation of Constitutional Court reservations, but it remains contested terrain pending Senate review and any judicial test.

What is not in serious dispute is that Congo's institutional channels for resolving this standoff are fragmenting rather than converging. The C64 coalition's Rome declaration is notable precisely because it refuses to anoint either camp: it rejects both the "constitutional coup" logic attributed to Tshisekedi's allies and the armed-takeover logic Kabila has embraced, while proposing separate meetings with each man to prepare an inclusive dialogue under African facilitation and church mediation. This is the most intellectually honest position on offer so far, and it deserves more attention than it has received. A credible dialogue cannot be convened by either belligerent on his own terms; it requires guarantors neither side controls, a point Kabila himself concedes in principle even as his own conduct, taking up arms while demanding independent arbitration, undermines his credibility as an advocate for it.

For readers across Central Africa, the stakes extend well beyond Kinshasa's corridors of power. A protracted contest over constitutional legitimacy, layered atop an active insurgency in the east, compounds every other crisis the country faces, including an Ebola outbreak that has now passed 10,000 cases amid acknowledged weaknesses in contact tracing, and a mining sector where evicted artisanal workers in Kolwezi are already complaining that compensation falls far short of what the law requires. Governments distracted by survival politics govern worse on everything else. The region's institutions, the African Union facilitation led by Angola and Togo, and the churches invoked by C64, have a narrow window to insist that any dialogue be structured by neutral terms rather than convened as a victory lap by whichever side feels momentarily stronger.

The defensible position, then, is neither to romanticise Kabila's return as resistance to authoritarian drift, nor to accept uncritically Tshisekedi's claim that constitutional revision and armed rebellion are simply two faces of the same Rwandan-sponsored threat. Both men have strong incentives to blur the line between legitimate grievance and the pursuit of power by other means. The Congolese public, and the region watching it, would be better served by sustained pressure for an independently guaranteed process, one that addresses the ceasefire, the referendum's scope, and the 2028 timetable together, rather than by accepting either leader's account of what dialogue should look like on his own terms.

Reporting context: - Kabila Backs Doha Talks but Keeps Armed Option, Casts Doubt on 2028 Vote as Tshisekedi Sets Different Dialogue Aims: /article/kabila-backs-doha-talks-but-keeps-armed-option-casts-doubt-on-2028-v-8074107ec9 - WHO Urges Sustained Ebola Response as DR Congo Cases Pass 10,000: /article/who-urges-sustained-ebola-response-as-dr-congo-cases-pass-10-000-764b9d779b - Evicted Kamilombe Miners in Kolwezi Receive Compensation Civil Society Calls Derisory: /article/evicted-kamilombe-miners-in-kolwezi-receive-compensation-civil-socie-792481869b - Tshisekedi Calls Kabila a Rwandan 'Proxy' After Ex-President Joins M23-Led Rebel Front: /article/tshisekedi-calls-kabila-a-rwandan-proxy-after-ex-president-joins-m23-1546a1881f - DR Congo's C64 Opposition Rejects Constitutional Change and Armed Takeover, Seeks Talks With Tshisekedi and Kabila: /article/dr-congo-s-c64-opposition-rejects-constitutional-change-and-armed-ta-a1585c03bc - DR Congo Opposition Lawmaker Says Referendum Law Leaves No Constitutional Provisions Locked: /article/dr-congo-opposition-lawmaker-says-referendum-law-leaves-no-constitut-959401b9d4

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