Opinion & Thought Leadership · East Africa
Somalia's Constitutional Crisis Is a Test of Whether Courts Still Matter in East Africa
By: Amara Tesfaye
Somalia's Supreme Court ruling against President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud's term extension, followed by reports of troops sent to the court, has become the region's most consequential story. It raises a question beyond Mogadishu: can judicial rulings still check executive power in East Africa, or are they becoming optional?
Of the stories moving through East African newsrooms this week, one stands apart for the stakes it carries beyond a single country's borders: the confrontation between Somalia's presidency and its Supreme Court. On Thursday, the court ruled that constitutional amendments passed by parliament could not lawfully have extended President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud's term, and that he should have left office in May. It ordered a new political agreement within thirty days and elections within ninety. Within a day, opposition figures were accusing the president of sending troops to the court's premises and attempting to arrest the chief justice, after the president's office had already moved to dismiss him. These are serious, if not fully independently verified, allegations, and they deserve to be treated with appropriate caution. But even allowing for that uncertainty, the episode has rapidly become the most consequential development reported across the region this week, for reasons that go well beyond Somali politics alone.
The reason this matters is structural, not merely dramatic. A judiciary's rulings are only as good as a government's willingness to accept them when they are inconvenient. Mohamud's government has argued that the constitutional amendments permit him to remain in office through a "transition period" ahead of what would be Somalia's first nationwide democratic elections, planned for 2027, replacing a clan-based system of representation. That is a defensible policy goal on its face: moving away from elder-selected representation toward direct elections is widely regarded as a democratic advance. But the opposition's characterisation of the amendments as a vehicle for a power grab cannot simply be dismissed either, particularly given that most opposition and regional parties boycotted the March parliamentary vote that passed them, and that violence followed in Mogadishu in June. When the losing side of a legal dispute responds not with an appeal but, allegedly, with troops at the courthouse door, the distinction between a constitutional disagreement and a constitutional breakdown begins to dissolve.
It is worth being precise about what is and is not established. The Supreme Court's ruling is reported fact. The deployment of troops and the attempted arrest of the chief justice are allegations made by the opposition and a former prime minister, Hassan Ali Khaire, including claims of torture that could not be independently verified at the time of reporting, though Somali media reportedly published images said to show military forces at the court compound. Residents of Mogadishu, understandably, are divided: some insist court rulings must be respected regardless of political convenience; others argue the ruling itself was flawed. This is not a case where commentary should rush past the evidentiary gaps to reach a tidy verdict. What can be said with confidence is that the perception of a court under duress, true or not, is itself corrosive to public confidence in Somali institutions at a moment when the country can least afford it.
The timing compounds the danger. Somalia's security architecture is under strain from another direction entirely: international donors are cutting funding for the African Union mission fighting al-Shabaab, and Uganda, its largest troop contributor, has announced it will withdraw entirely by the end of 2027. A government locked in a legitimacy dispute with its own judiciary is a government with less capacity to manage that security transition, to reassure international partners, or to hold together the fragile coalition of federal member states whose cooperation any credible 2027 election will require. Institutional disputes in Mogadishu do not stay contained in Mogadishu; they ripple into security planning across the Horn of Africa, a region already drawing outside military interest, as reflected in the still-unexplained stop by a British military transport aircraft at Puntland's Bosasso airport this week, and in Turkish ambitions for a spaceport on Somali soil. Instability invites external actors to fill vacuums on their own terms, not Somalia's.
There is also a wider regional resonance that East African readers should not overlook. Tanzania's courts this week delivered their own politically charged verdict, acquitting opposition leader Tundu Lissu of treason while convicting him of incitement, a charge Lissu says was never properly before the court. Whatever one makes of that outcome, it underscores a pattern worth naming plainly: across the region, judicial institutions are increasingly the arena in which contests over executive power are fought, and increasingly the target of suspicion from whichever side loses. That is not inherently a sign of democratic decay; courts adjudicating political disputes is, in principle, exactly what should happen instead of street violence or coups. The danger lies specifically in what follows a ruling a government dislikes: compliance, however reluctant, or coercion.
For African readers and policymakers, the practical implication is this: regional bodies, including the African Union and IGAD, and international partners financing Somalia's security transition, have a direct interest in insisting that the thirty-day political negotiation window and ninety-day election timeline the court has set are honoured without further interference in judicial processes. Whether Mohamud's government proves willing to work within those boundaries, rather than around them, will do more to determine Somalia's trajectory than any single election date. The temptation to treat this as an internal Somali matter should be resisted; the precedent it sets for how courts are treated when they rule against incumbents is one every government in the region is, consciously or not, watching closely.
Reporting context: - Tanzania's Chadema Hails 'Victorious Day' After Tundu Lissu Cleared of Treason but Jailed for Incitement: /article/tanzania-s-chadema-hails-victorious-day-after-tundu-lissu-cleared-of-f2ef72f340 - Somalia's Opposition Accuses President of Sending Troops to Supreme Court After Term Extension Ruled Unlawful: /article/somalia-s-opposition-accuses-president-of-sending-troops-to-supreme--eae36b0918 - British Military A400M Cargo Plane Makes Unexplained Stop at Somalia's Bosasso Airport: /article/british-military-a400m-cargo-plane-makes-unexplained-stop-at-somalia-f35518b52c - Türkiye Plans $400 Million Space Programme Investment and Advances Somalia Spaceport Plans: /article/t-rkiye-plans-400-million-space-programme-investment-and-advances-so-fb5da61e4e