Opinion & Thought Leadership · Southern Africa
Southern Africa's Economic Zones and the Mirage of Easy Industrialisation
By: Tumi Dlamini
A World Bank review of South Africa's Coega special economic zone, alongside Botswana's solar push and Namibia's oil-governance standoff, exposes a shared regional temptation: betting on flagship projects and investor incentives while neglecting the institutional patience industrialisation actually requires.
Among the week's reporting from Southern Africa, one thread deserves more scrutiny than it has received: the quiet reckoning now underway over whether the region's signature instrument for industrial transformation, the special economic zone, is working as advertised. A World Bank assessment of South Africa's dozen SEZs, anchored by the flagship Coega development outside Port Elizabeth, found that public authorities poured more than one billion euros into these zones between 2016 and 2024, and that revenues exceeded expenditure for the first time only in 2024. That is not a damning verdict, but it is a sobering one, and it arrives alongside other reporting from Botswana and Namibia that, read together, sketches a region still negotiating the terms on which it will industrialise and extract value from its resources.
Coega is instructive precisely because it is not a failure in the crude sense. It houses Chinese vehicle assemblers, a fruit-processing exporter moving over a thousand cartons an hour, and a deep-water port with substantial container capacity. It employed roughly 11,000 people in 2025. Yet, as reported, large tracts of its more than 9,000 hectares remain empty, some anticipated projects never materialised, and the tax incentives on offer are widely regarded as unattractive relative to competing jurisdictions. Anthony Black, an the publication at the University of Cape Town, makes the sharper point: it is difficult to know how much of the investment Coega attracted would have happened anyway, incentives or not. That is the uncomfortable question every SEZ programme on the continent must eventually answer, and South Africa, despite two decades of effort and over 230 such zones existing across Africa, has not yet produced a convincing one.
My own reading of this is that the mixed Coega record is not primarily a failure of execution but of design philosophy. Special economic zones were conceived, in South Africa as elsewhere, as a way to concentrate infrastructure spending and regulatory carve-outs in a bounded space, on the theory that investment would follow certainty. What the World Bank's figures suggest instead is that infrastructure and support costs have been comparatively high, incentives comparatively thin, and the resulting additionality, the investment that would not have happened without the zone, hard to demonstrate. If a programme can run for the better part of a decade before its revenues clear its costs, policymakers owe the public a franker account of what return on that billion-euro commitment is actually expected, and by when.
The counterargument deserves airing. Industrial zones elsewhere in the world took decades, not years, to mature, and judging Coega on a short horizon risks discarding infrastructure, port capacity and institutional learning that may yet pay off as global supply chains continue to diversify away from single sourcing countries. The Ngqura port's container capacity, still only partially utilised, is a sunk asset that could become more valuable as regional trade under the African Continental Free Trade Area deepens. Patience has a case. But patience is not the same as drift, and the reporting gives no indication that Pretoria has set out a clear timetable or threshold for deciding when an underperforming zone should be redesigned rather than simply refunded.
This same tension between flagship ambition and institutional follow-through recurs elsewhere in the region's news this week, in different registers. Botswana's 100-megawatt solar plant at Jwaneng, developed with a Sino-Botswanan consortium and backed by a 25-year power purchase agreement, represents the more encouraging version of this story: a concrete project, a defined capacity, a stated national target of fifty percent renewables by 2036, and a financing structure that at least on paper allocates risk clearly between the state utility and the developer. Namibia's unfolding fight over its Petroleum Exploration and Production Amendment Bill is the more contested version, where opposition lawmakers boycotted Parliament to deny quorum rather than let a vote proceed on a new regulatory unit housed in the Presidency and on local-content rules for an oil sector the government values at roughly ten billion US dollars. Both cases, like Coega, turn on the same underlying question: who bears the cost of getting the institutional architecture wrong, and who is accountable for correcting it once it becomes clear that the incentives on offer are not producing the promised scale of investment or local benefit.
For African readers, and for policymakers in the region in particular, the practical implication is this: large capital projects, whether zones, plants or extractive licensing regimes, should be designed from the outset with built-in review points and public reporting on additionality, not merely aggregate spending and employment figures. Coega's story, as presented, is not yet a cautionary tale of wasted money; it is a reminder that the hardest part of industrial policy is not launching the project but being honest, years later, about whether it did what it was meant to do, and adjusting accordingly rather than simply renewing the promise.
Reporting context: - South Africa's Special Economic Zones Show Mixed Results as Coega Struggles to Fill Land: /article/south-africa-s-special-economic-zones-show-mixed-results-as-coega-st-503cfed5ab - Namibian Opposition Boycott Stalls Vote on Petroleum Exploration Amendment Bill: /article/namibian-opposition-boycott-stalls-vote-on-petroleum-exploration-ame-6bbd0a385f - Botswana Advances 100-Megawatt Solar Plant at Jwaneng to Cut Reliance on Coal: /article/botswana-advances-100-megawatt-solar-plant-at-jwaneng-to-cut-relianc-781e09fc71